Reclaiming Empathy

Abstract: Within contemporary public and political discourse, invocations of empathy crop up everywhere. For example, many people have pointed to the need for more empathetic leadership in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Along these same lines, the Biden-Harris campaign ran on a platform of empathy; at their election victory celebration, they entered the stage against a backdrop of massive screens that read, "The People Have Chosen Empathy." Much of this discourse is optimistic about the power of empathy to bridge social divides, heal deep wounds, and foster the growth of a kinder, more egalitarian society. This optimism fits within a long tradition that places empathy at the center of our moral lives.

Against this optimistic view, however, are some serious concerns about the "dark sides" of empathy. Moral psychologists have shown that empathy is subject to our worst psychological biases. It is partial and parochial.  Empathy has a spotlight effect, meaning that it zooms in on the plight of a single individual, or perhaps at most a limited group of individuals. Those individuals tend to already be within our circle of moral concern—similar to us, within our "in-group."  While empathy may motivate us to help other individuals, its partiality and parochialism lead us to distribute help unevenly and ineffectually. Perhaps more damning are results showing that empathy decreases for members of outgroups, even when those outgroups are artificially constructed. These findings suggest that empathy, rather than bridging divides, may further entrench them. These findings have led moral psychologists and philosophers to demote empathy—at least when it comes to morality. 

In this paper, I argue that we need not give up on empathy, that it can and should occupy an important place in our moral lives—even to promote the ends of justice. To make the case for empathy, we must also do some work to reclaim the concept. I do this by showing that Bloom and Prinz both adopt a reductive concept of empathy, one that is apt for scientific research (at certain stages) but that unduly restricts its scope. Such a concept is ill suited for the moral work that we want it to do. Furthermore, empathy does not operate in a vacuum. Outside of the lab, it functions in conjunction with a whole suite of other psychological capacities that regulate how it operates within particular environments and contexts. To put empathy to work in projects that promote justice, we need a more expansive concept. I argue that such a concept must emphasize the epistemic function of empathy. I suggest that in political contexts—and perhaps in other domains such as medicine—empathy needs to be paired with humility to facilitate interpersonal connection and perhaps, begin to bridge the divides that are so deeply entrenched in our societies.