Colloquium: “Spinoza on the Unity of the Virtues”

Abstract: The topic of the unity of the virtues, so prominent in ancient philosophy, might seem rather scarce among texts of early modern philosophy. However, virtue ethics was alive and well in the seventeenth century, including in works of moral philosophy by such anti-Aristotelians as Descartes and Spinoza, as well as in the ethical writings of Leibniz (who was somewhat more friendly to Aristotelian Scholasticism than his peers). My goal in this lecture is to demonstrate that Spinoza, for one, is committed to the unity of the virtues; and, I argue, he is committed to it in what I will label its strong version. Virtue for Spinoza is just one thing. It is what he calls fortitudo, or strength of character, the consistent abiding by the dictates of reason in thought, feeling and action. All the particular virtues— courage, temperance, honesty, and so on — far from being distinct states of character each generating its own kind of activity, are nothing but fortitudo exhibited in one set of circumstances or another.

The department and the PNP program coordinate regular colloquia, typically on Thursdays at 4pm. These represent a major part of the education experience in the department, and graduate students are expected to attend.