A Case Against a Case for the Neo-Aristotelian Thesis

Abstract:

Hylomorphism is the Aristotelian theory according to which substances are composed of matter and form. Matter conceived as a collection of ordinary things—the bricks and timbers in a house—doesn’t require much of an existential case, but form certainly does. Contemporary hylomorphists have rallied around an argument offered by Kathrin Koslicki which purports to show that substances have forms as proper parts. I show that her argument succeeds only in cases of artifacts or accidental unities, things like statues and wise-Socrates, not substances. This is due to the fact that Koslicki’s argument hinges on cases where hylomorphism simply isn’t applicable. After showing the only ways around my argument abandon some of the core principles motivating hylomorphism, I close with a suggestion for how hylomorphists might move forward.